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allowed as evidence of substantial expenditure; however, the question of
what dollar amount is required to make these expenditures substantial was
not fully discussed. Although the issue is normally left to the jury, the
court indicated that the mere purchase of property, no matter what the
cost, will not suffice.46 Thus, the jury is left with almost unlimited latitude
in determining the dollar amount of expenditure necessary for the creation
of a vested right. Perhaps a better solution than leaving so much dis-
cretion with the jury would be to establish a certain minimum percentage
of the estimated total cost of building as the necessary requirement for a
vested right to complete construction. The main disadvantage in estab-
lishing a fixed minimum percentage is readily observed when one considers
large-scale enterprises. Such undertakings would be required to expend
greater sums in order to satisfy the percentage requirement. If they fall
short, the right to complete construction is lost. Meanwhile, less ex-
pansive enterprises can easily satisfy the requirement with a propor-
tionately smaller expenditure, thus acquiring a vested right to complete
construction. A suggested minimum percentage would, however, provide
a useful rule-of-thumb in many instances.
Despite some unanswered questions, the area of vested rights is now
much clearer in North Carolina. A permittee now knows that money
expended on anything incidental to the proposed use-building contracts,
equipment, purchase money-will be allowed as evidence of substantial
expenditures, a position that prior cases have only intimated. Whether
the court must now determine the enforceability of contracts as part of
the test of substantial expenditures is unclear. Exactly how much of the
total cost of construction must be expended before the vested right
accrues is left to the jury's discretion and will probably change with each
set of facts. In any event, it is safe to predict that future permittees will
have an easier task in acquiring a vested right.
ELIZABETHa LYNNE Pou
Securities Regulation-Allowance of Attorneys' Fees
in 14(a) Derivative Suits
With the recognition of an implied private right of action under sec-
tion 14(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,1 individual shareholders
"276 N.C. 55, 170 S.E.2d at 909.
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964) [here-
inafter cited as 14(a)], provides:
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became potentially important agents in the enforcement of federal proxy
rules and policy.' Indeed, the court in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak considered
such private enforcement "a necessary supplement" to government action.3
This private enforcement may take the form of a shareholder derivative
suit ;4 but such suits are particularly costly, and recovery is generally had
by the corporation exclusively. 5 Recognizing this, the Supreme Court
in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co." made an interim award of attorneys'
fees to successful plaintiff-shareholders when they established a manage-
ment violation of the federal proxy rules.
In Mills, plaintiff-shareholders brought an action under 14(a) and
Securities Exchange Commission rule 14a-97 promulgated thereunder.8
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national
securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the
use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to
section 781 of this title.
2J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
31 d. at 432.
'Derivative and direct actions may be brought under 14(a) by private parties.
Id. at 431.
'See, e.g., Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
0396 U.S. 375 (1970).
'SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1970), provides:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communica-
tion, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the
light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statement therein not false or misleading or
necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect
to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which
has become false or misleading.
(b) The fact that a proxy statement, form of proxy or other soliciting
material has been filed with or examined by the Commission shall not be
deemed a finding by the Commission that such material is accurate or com-
plete or not false or misleading, or that the Commission has passed upon the
merits of or approved any statement contained therein or any matter to be
acted upon by security holders. No representation contrary to the foregoing
shall be made.
The plaintiffs in Mills asserted that their action was derivative and on behalf of
all minority shareholders as a class. 403 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1968).
8 Plaintiffs alleged that management had carried on a materially misleading proxy
solicitation which resulted in shareholder approval of a proposed corporate merger.
Plaintiffs sought to set aside the merger. The district court held the proxy solicita-
tion to be materially misleading, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, but decided if
management could show the merger would have occurred in any event, plaintiffs.
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No question of attorneys' fees was presented in the lower courts,0 but
when Mills reached the Supreme Court the issue was injected into the
litigation by the federal government as amicus curiae.'0 The government
maintained that once a violation of 14(a) had been established, plaintiff-
shareholders should be entitled to litigation expenses, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, to "enable them to go forward with the trial on the issue
of appropriate relief and ... for their efforts in establishing the violation.""
The government contended that private actions under 14(a) would be
"seriously inhibited" if such fees were not awarded. 12 The government
thus requested the Court to decide in favor of two awards: the first for the
expense of establishing the 14(a) violation; the second for the future
expense of litigating the remanded relief issue.'" Surprisingly, the corpo-
rate defendant did not contest the proposition that attorneys' fees should
be awarded successful plaintiff-shareholders in 14(a) litigation. Instead,
it chose to stress its particular situation as militating against such an
award.' 4
would be entitled to no relief. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit held management
need only show that the merger was fair to establish that it would have occurred in
any event. The Supreme Court held that since plaintiffs had shown the proxy
statements to be materially misleading, no actual effect on the voting process need
be demonstrated to entitle plaintiffs to relief. While not deciding what, if any,
relief should be given, the Court stated that plaintiffs' cause of action was estab-
lished under the federal proxy rules; to hold otherwise would discourage necessary
private actions and substitute judicial judgment for shareholder judgment as to
the desirability of management proposals. In this posture, the case was remanded
on the issue of relief. For a discussion of the materiality problem in Mills see, Note,
Shareholder Derivative Suits Under Ride 14a-9, 49 N.C.L. Rnv. 215 (1970).
The district court opinion is reported at 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
the circuit court opinion is reported at 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968).
"o The amicus brief was filed by the Justice Department in October 1969, how-
ever, SEC counsel participated in its preparation.
x' Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
12
Id. at 11.
8 In asking the Court to decide whether plaintiffs should be entitled to recover
attorneys' fees for future litigation on the issue of relief, the government recognized
the potential for abuse and suggested that plaintiffs be required to show a sub-
stantial possibility that defendants' proof of fairness might be successfully contro-
verted. Id. at 21. The Court, however, declined to decide whether plaintiffs would
be entitled to an award for future expenses. That decision was reserved for the
lower courts after trial could be had on the relief issue. 396 U.S. 375, 390 n.13
(1970).
"' Basically, the corporate defendant contended that the plaintiff-shareholders had
deliberately chosen to withhold their complaint until after the merger and that
an award of attorneys' fees in such a case would "encourage plaintiffs to lie in wait
until it is too late to rectify alleged deficiencies [in the proxy material] .... " On
the other hand, the defendant stressed that had suit been brought before the share-
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As a general rule, litigants may not recover attorneys' fees absent
specific statutory authorization or contractual agreement.15 An exception
to this rule has developed in derivative suits, however, where a fee award
is now generally held recoverable if the successful shareholder's suit has
"substantially benefited" the corporation.16 Courts have traditionally
recognized that it is inequitable for one party to bear the entire expense of
securing a group benefitY.1 This equitable recognition is firmly grounded
in the policy against unjust enrichment.' 8 An early illustration of its
operation is creditor litigation where often one creditor would procure or
protect funds out of which other creditors found satisfaction. In such
cases courts have uniformly held that it is only fair that the benefited
creditors share the litigation expenses.' 9 Corporate derivative suits are
particularly suited for such treatment since derivative theory envisions
plaintiff-shareholders as champions defending the rights of their corpo-
ration. 0 The totality of shareholders is generally recognized as con-
stituting the corporation,2 1 and since it is the corporation that recovers in
a successful derivative suit, then logically litigation expenses should be
apportioned among all the shareholders. This apportionment can be
mechanically accomplished by an award of attorneys' fees against the
corporation.2
holder meeting the proxy statements could have easily been corrected, or if neces-
sary, the meeting could have been postponed. Had such been the case, the corporate
defendant submitted, "[a]warding of attorneys' fees . . . would serve as an
additional incentive to prompt assertion of claimed violations of the Proxy Rules."
Brief for Respondents at 29-33, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970).
"E.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717
(1967).
"See, e.g., Bosch v. Meeker Co-op Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101
N.W.2d 423 (1960).
"See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Natl Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees
v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
" It has also been suggested that where one party secures a judgment benefiting
a group, that party may have acquired an implied representative status whereby he
was authorized by the group to retain counsel and proceed to judgment. Another
theory holds that property which has been secured by an attorney's services should
bear the cost thereof. See, Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor
in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV. 658 (1956).
"See, e.g., Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881); In re Williams, 29
F. Cas. 1324, 1325 (No. 17704) (C.C.D.S.C. 1868).
" See, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
"State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 244 Iowa 785, 806, 56 N.W.2d 173, 187
(1952).
22 Id.
" An interesting question to consider is whether in 14(a) litigation the corpo-
1970]
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Yet, on the other hand, it would seem most undesirable if attorneys'
fees against the corporation were awarded plaintiff-shareholders in every
derivative suit. Since one major policy underlying such awards is unjust
enrichment, the corporation must, at the very least, be enriched. Early
cases required an enrichment taking the form of a "pecuniary benefit,"
24
but the modem view holds a "substantial benefit" will suffice .2  The
difficulty today is discovering what benefits will be deemed substantial;
modern cases display much uncertainty. In Saks v. Gamble,2" for in-
stance, the defendant corporation withheld information concerning its
ownership of a second corporation. Shareholders, unaware of the owner-
ship, brought a derivative action for diversion of corporate opportunities.
Thereafter, the defendant corporation disclosed its ownership and was
held to have substantially benefited thereby.' On the other hand, share-
holders successfully precluded directors from serving competing corpo-
rations simultaneously in Schechtman. v. Wolfson,2s but were held not to
have substantially benefited their corporation." In Bosch v. Meeker Co-op
Light and Power Association,30 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
the determination of substantial benefit is for the trial court but enunciated
this guide for the lower courts to follow:
[A] substantial benefit must be something more than technical in its
successful conseqeuence and be one that accomplishes a result which
corrects or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights
and interests of the corporation or affects the enjoyment or protection
of an essential right to the shareholder's interest.81
One fairly clear condition precedent to a finding of substantial benefit
is a court victory by the pliantiff-shareholder.32 Not infrequently, how-
ration should have the right to go against the directors who are responsible for the
14(a) violation. If such right of action exists, then the question would arise as to
whether the directors would have the right to be indemnified by the corporation.
If such be the case, then the corporation's attempt to hold the directors liable is
useless.
2 See, e.g., Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
"o Bosch v. Meeker Co-op Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423
(1960). See also Note, Shareholder Suits: Pecuniary Benefit Unnecessary for
Counsel Fee Award, 13 STAN. L. Rxv. 146 (1960).
2638 Del. Ch. 504, 154 A.2d 767 (Ch. 1958).
27 Id. at 507, 154 A.2d at 770.
" 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
29 Id. at 540.
" 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
811 Id. at 366-67, 101 N.W.2d at 426-27.
12 State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 244 Iowa 785, 810, 56 N.W.2d 173, 198 (1952).
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ever, management will render a pending case moot by performing essen-
tially as the complaint demands prior to trial.m In such cases, attorneys'
fees may still be awarded if the plaintiff-shareholder can show a causal
relationship between the beneficial management performance and the in-
stitution of the derivative suit. 4 In Kahan v. Rosenstiel,5 the court held
that if attorneys' fees were to be awarded after the suit had been rendered
moot, there must be some demonstration of the meritorious nature of the
suit; this merit may be shown by proof that the suit would have withstood
a motion to dismiss.
6
The Court in Mills experienced little difficulty finding a substantial
benefit. This finding was largely based on congressional policy favoring
an informed corporate electorate.3 Private actions vindicating that policy
were described as "corporate therapeutics."3 Since the finding is based
on congressional policy, it is clear that the "substantial benefit" require-
ment will be satisfactorily met in all derivative actions under 14(a) once
plaintiff-shareholders establish a violation of the federal proxy rules.
Relying on Mills, all plaintiff-shareholders will undoubtedly seek attorneys'
fees in 14(a) derivative suits. Presumably the Court could have reached
the same result by simply holding federal policy sufficiently strong to
necessitate a fee award. Such a holding would have obviated the sub-
stantial benefit analysis in Mills, but it would seem a proper and logical
holding in light of Borak.39
The mechanical finding of a substantial benefit once the 14(a) viola-
tion has been established may be attacked in many cases as illogical. In
"E.g., Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957), where suit was
brought to break an interlocking board of directors and the board voluntarily un-
locked prior to trial; Yap v. Wah Yen Kituk, 43 Hawaii 37 (1958), where suit
was brought alleging a corporate loan to be ultra vires and the loan was voluntarily
returned prior to final decree; Greenough v. Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co., 52 Idaho
599, 18 P.2d 288 (1932), where suit was brought to compel a director to returp
certain stock allegedly wrongfully sold him and the stock was voluntarily returned
prior to trial.
" See, e.g., 244 F.2d 537, 540 (1957), Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807,
809 (1968), Treves v. Servel, Inc., 38 Del. Ch. 483, 154 A.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
300 F. Supp. 447 (D. Del. 1969).
Id. at 450.
'1 "[T]he stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair and informed
corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicating the statutory policy,
petitioners have rendered a substantial service to the corporation and its share-
holders." 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970).
aI Id.
" Regarding 14(a), the Court in Borak stated that "it is the duty of the courts
to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make. effective the con-
gressional purpose." 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1966).
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Mills itself, for instance, management owned a majority of the Electric
Auto-Lite stock.40 If the merger which took place is ultimately held fair,
it may be argued that Electric Auto-Lite could not logically be said to
have "substantially benefited" from years of costly litigation. One answer
to such an argument is as follows: If the vindication of federal law and
policy is beneficial, then the question of whether a benefit accrues in
actions such as Mills is quickly answered in the affirmative. The more
difficult question is who benefited. Clearly, the enforcement of any public
law should produce a public benefit and the the pertinent question is
whether this benefit extends to corporations like Electric Auto-Lite. It is
submitted that even if Electric Auto-Lite were not directly benefited, it
received a substantial indirect benefit in that future proxy solicitations are
less likely to include misleading statements. At the very least, manage-
ment, having paid a heavy price for what was probably a wholly un-
necessary nondisclosure, will certainly be made more cognizant of share-
holders' rights. This type of benefit is clearly what the federal proxy rules
are designed to produce, and the award of attorneys' fees in such actions
enhances the viability of those rules. Thus, the Court's finding of a sub-
stantial benefit in Mills is probably correct, but the analysis could have
been avoided by a holding based exclusively on federal policy and Borak.
The award of attorneys' fees in derivative suits, however, has not gone
without criticism even where a substantial benefit is clear. A number of
reasons have been suggested for applying the general rule of no fee awards
to derivative litigation. One of these reasons is essentially ethical. It
has been argued that the availabiilty of fee awards in 16(b) 41 suits tempts
lawyers to engage in champerty. 42 Closely associated with this considera-
tion is the fear that fee awards may increase the presence of "strike
suits,"-suits instituted mainly for their nuisance value.4 It has not
been demonstrated, however, that fee awards in derivative suits have
substantially increased unethical behavior. Were this shown, it would still
be necessary to determine whether the policies against such behavior out-
4 396 U.S. 375, 379 (1970). It is interesting to speculate on how the Court in
Mil/s would have held had management owned sufficient stock to have rendered
the proxy solicitation unnecessary. Presumably in such a case federal policy would
indicate a similar substantial benefit analysis, but the good faith of plaintiffs would
doubtless be a serious consideration.
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) [here-
inafter 16(b)].
,See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1051-54 (2d ed. 1961).
"See Bosch v. Meeker Co-op Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d
423 (1960).
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weigh those in favor of fee awards. The court in Magida v. Conti-
nental Can Co." was presented with the question of whether alleged
champertous conduct on the part of an attorney who brought suit for a
plaintiff-shareholder under 16(b) would preclude a fee award. While
the court found that the party raising the question had no standing to do
so,4" it nevertheless stated:
Whatever the ethics of the situation .. . [p]resumably Congress is
aware of the opportunity presented to attorneys to finance suits for their
benefit, but apparently it regards public policy against ... violations
of fiduciary responsibility by corporate officers at the expense of the
public more detrimental to public good than the violation of generally
accepted ethics by attorneys.46
The court in State ex rel. Weede v. Bechte47 maintained that since deriv-
ative suits are the chief regulators of corporate management, and strike
suits comparatively rare,48 fee awards to successful plaintiff-shareholders
are hardly too much inducement.49 The court in Bechtel pointed out
that in order to receive such an award the plaintiff-shareholder must first
win his suit, and even victory will net him no more than his fellow share-
holder.6" Thus it is unlikely an attorney would desire to support a deriv-
ative suit unless victory was substantially certain, and even if that were
the case, it is doubtful that a shareholder would be susceptible to such a
champertous attorney since the shareholder would generally stand to
win nothing individually. Consequently, ethical considerations seem a
questionable basis for opposition to the derivative rule.
More forceful reasons for denying attorneys' fees found expression
in a recent Eighth Circuit case, Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Slayton.51
In Slayton, management had proposed a consolidation plan to be voted on
" 176 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
,Id. at 782.'8 Id. at 783. On the other hand, some courts have expressed much doubt as to
whether an attorney-shareholder should be allowed a fee award as attorney pro se
in a derivative action if his holdings in the corporation are small. In such an
action "considerable doubt is cast upon his good faith . . . ." Eisenberg v. Central
Zone Property Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 353, -, 149 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (1956), aff'd
mien., 3 N.Y.2d 729, 143 N.E.2d 516, 163 N.Y.S.2d 968, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 884
(1957). But see Giesecke v. Pittsburgh Hotels, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 64 (W.D. Pa.
1949), af'd, 180 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1950).
" 244 Iowa 785, 56 N.W.2d 173 (1952).
Is Id. at 804, 56 N.W.2d at 183.
,0 Id. at 807, 56 N.W.2d at 185.
uo Id." 407 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1969).
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collectively. The stock situation was such that a collective vote would
have effectively disfranchised Class "B" shareholders. 2 The Class "B"
shareholders promptly instituted a class action to compel class voting and
were ultimately successful in the Supreme Court.53 Plaintiff-shareholders
thereafter sought attorneys' fees and were initially successful against the
corporate defendant in federal district court.5 4 The court of appeals re-
versed the fee award, 5 however, reasoning that the unpredictability of
litigation should not unnecessarily penalize one for bringing or defending
a lawsuit and that courts should not be saddled with the burden of deter-
mining reasonable attorneys' fees.5 6
The difficulty with the Slayton rationale is that it loses sight of the
equitable basis for fee awards, which is not to penalize anyone, but rather
to distribute the expense of litigation among those who can be said to
have benefited therefrom. While calculating reasonable attorneys' fees may
be a difficult task, it is one which can and has been performed. 7 But even
assuming awarding attorneys' fees to be a difficult task, the result to be
reached certainly outweighs the burden.
A somewhat different problem which the Court in Mills addressed
is whether the absence of statutory provision should preclude 14(a) fee
awards. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act prescribes no
The voting shares stood as follows:
Class A 1,856,277 shares
Class B 39,731 shares
Total 1,896,008 shares
The consolidation proposal according to management's plan would require a vote
of 1,264,006 shares. Obviously, a collective vote would permit Class A shareholders
to prevail by a comfortable margin. Slayton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 279 F. Supp.
526 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
Levin v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 386 U.S. 162 (1967).
279 F. Supp. at 526.
407 F.2d at 1082.
'Id.
In many cases there may be no difficulty in calculating reasonable attorneys'
fees. Where a fund is recovered, for instance, a percentage thereof can easily be
awarded. The value of an attorney's services in other cases can be asertained by
taking into consideration these factors: time necessarily spent on the case; amounts
involved; amounts recovered; and the standing of the attorney(s) in the profession.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 244 Iowa 785, 833-35, 56 N.W.2d 173,
199-202 (1952) ; Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: Tie "Salvage" Factor in Counsel
Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REv. 658 (1956). Another factor that should perhaps
be taken into consideration in awarding attorneys' fees is whether the corporation
needed the proxy solicitation in order to go forward with the planned change. If,
for instance, management has over the two-thirds votes necessary for the impending
merger but decides to go ahead with a proxy solicitation which proves to be in viola-
tion of 14(a), shouldn't the fact that the proxy solicitation was an unnecessary
formality be taken into consideration by the court awarding attorneys' fees?
[Vol. 49
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attorneys' fees, whereas other sections of the Act make express provision
therefor. s The Court resolved this problem by relying on a Second Circuit
decision that awarded attorneys' fees in an action brought under section
16(b) which, like 14(a), contained no attorneys' fees provision."9 Yet
the Court considered it necessary to distinguish Fleischman Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co.60 where it had disallowed a fee award for not being
statutorily prescribed by the Lanham Act. Fleischman, however, was
not a derivative suit and could easily have been distinguished on that
ground. The Court was certainly correct in holding an absence of statutory
provision should not be determinative of a fee award since such awards are
traditionally equitable and have become the rule in derivative suits.
It should be borne in mind, however, that plaintiff-shareholders in
Mills sued both derivatively and as a class. While the Court neglected to
stress this distinction, it nonetheless relied on derivative cases to support
its substantial benefit analysis.6 1 On the other hand, 14(a) suits may be
brought directly.12 The question of whether a fee award may be granted
in a direct action which substantially benefits the corporation has not been
clearly decided.63 Professor Henn indicates uncertainty in his treatment
of the issue which suggests the following:
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§9(e) & 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§78i(e) &
78r(a) (1964), specifically provide for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees in
cases involving manipulation of security prices and misleading statements in docu-
ments filed with the SEC. Of course, the fact that a statute fails to make some
specific provision has rarely restrained the Court from implying such a provision
or otherwise reaching a result consistent therewith. The Court in Mills stated that
"sections 9(e) and 18(a) should not be read as denying to the coarts the power to
award counsel fees in suits under other sections of the Act when circumstances
make such an award appropriate .... " 396 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970) (emphasis
added).
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
00386 U.S. 714 (1967). In Fleischinann, the Supreme Court affirmed an
appellate court decision reversing a lower court award of attorneys' fees in a suit
brought under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement. The opinion by Chief
Justice Warren stated that where a statute creating the cause of action expressly
provides remedies, other remedies should not readily be implied. The Court in
Mills distinguished Fleischnwmn as involving a statute which meticulously detailed
its remedies unlike the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
396 U.S. 375, 395 (1970).
" J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
" Compare Riddell v. Cascade Paper Co., 56 Wash. 2d 663, 355 P.2d 3. (1960)
(court found no substantial benefit in an individual shareholder action to determine
-voting rights) with Benson Co-op Creamery Ass'n v. First District Ass'n, 276
Minn. 520, 151 N.W.2d 422 (1967) (court noted plaintiff's action was for his sole
benefit and "under these circumstances [did] not believe [it] should extend the
right to recover attorneys' fees to this type of action.") Id. at 531, 151 N.W.2d at
429.
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Where the shareholder brings a direct ... action and recovers a fund
in behalf of a class, he should be reimbursed from such fund. Absent a
class fund, presumably the normal rule that a litigant pays his own liti-
gation expense should apply. 4
Yet attorneys' fees should be recoverable in direct suits, provided the
corporation substantially benefits. The problem with direct actions is
that generally the benefits conferred thereby are purely individual. Cer-
tainly, the corporation will be substantially benefited by derivative actions
more frequently than by direct actions due to the individual nature of the
latter. If, however, a substantial benefit is shown accruing to the corpo-
ration as a result of a direct action, the fact that the action was not deriv-
ative should be no reason for denying a fee award. The essential quacre
should be whether the corporation substantially benefited from the litiga-
tion, not whether the litigation producing the substantial benefit was direct
or derivative. It is thus interesting to question whether 14(a) direct
actions fall within the Mills rationale. Clearly, federal policy is not con-
tingent upon the form in which a 14(a) claim is brought; and since the
Court in Mills based its finding of a substantial benefit on federal policy,
it should make no difference whether the 14(a) violation is uncovered
derivatively or directly.
The next obvious step is an application of Mills to Section 10 of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act.6 5 The core of this section and Rule lOb-5,
promulgated thereunder, is "the implementation of the congressional pur-
pose that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participa-
tion in securities transactions." 6 It is presently the most dynamic tool in
federal corporation law, and the federal policy is therefore certainly as
strong behind lOb-5 as it is behind 14(a). When shareholders bring a
successful 10b-5 derivative action, then, courts should have little difficulty
finding a substantial benefit based on federal policy. Arguably, this finding
should not differ in direct 10b-5 suits, since the federal policy does not
change with the pleading form. Consequently, courts may transpose the
federally grounded substantial benefit analysis in Mills to lOb-5 actions
and thereby significantly develop federal corporation law.
JAMES MARIUS BELL
H4 -. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 798 (2d ed. 1970) (emphasis added).
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964); SEC Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970). Attorneys' fees have been held recoverable in
one recent action brought under 10b-5, however, the decision made no reference to
federal policy. Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
" SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968).
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